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OUR UNCONSTITUTIONAL SENATE
Suzanna Sherry*
In the race to the bottom that characterizes this Symposium,
I cast my vote for Article I, section 3: "The Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State ....
Indeed, were this provision not unequivocally enshrined in the
Constitution itself, it would undoubtedly be unconstitutional, for,
as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, it is in conflict with the most basic principles of democracy underlying our
Constitution and the form of government it establishes.
The Court has held that "[1]egislators represent people, not
trees or acres,"1 and that "[t]he conception of political equality
from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one vote."2 To hold
otherwise would be to allow a vote to be "worth more in one
district than in another" and would thus "run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government."3 The Court has accordingly invalidated legislative districting schemes where the
disparity in population between the largest and smallest districts
entitled to the same number of legislators is as little as 1.07 to 1.4
How, then, can a democratic nation tolerate a Senate in which
the largest state has more than 65 times the population of the
smallest and yet each has two Senators? Moreover, the Court has
waxed eloquent on the inequity of "minority control of... legislative bodies" in "a society ostensibly grounded on representative government."5 What, then, should we conclude about a
Senate in which slightly over 17% of the population elects a majority of the members?
*

Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of

Minnesota.

1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
2.

Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).

3. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
4. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (invalidating Congressional districts
where maximum deviation was 0.7%); but see Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983)
(upholding state legislative districts where maximum deviation was 89%).
5. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
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To answer that the provision, while indefensible, is harmless
because laws require the concurrence of the House of Representatives as well, is to forget that the Senate has unique powers. On
October 15, 1991, the Senate voted to confirm Clarence Thomas
to the Supreme Court, by a vote of 52 to 48.6 But the vote in the
Senate conceals an exactly opposite split in the population at
large. The delegations from twenty-two states split their votes,
with one Senator voting in favor and one against. Fifteen states
voted entirely in favor and thirteen entirely against. Tallying the
populations of each state (and allocating half the population of
the split-vote states to each side) yields the conclusion that the
Senators voting in favor of Judge Thomas represented 48% of
the population and the Senators voting against him represented
52% of the population.7 A single change in vote by Senator
D'Amato from New York would have increased the margin to
56% against, without changing the result; a single change in vote
by Senator Seymour of California would have increased the margin to 58% against, again without changing the result. (If both
men had switched their votes, the percentage against would have
increased to 62%, and presumably Vice President Quayle would
have cast the deciding vote in favor.) Justice Thomas still sits on
the United States Supreme Court despite the fact that the representatives of a majority of the population voted against him.8
The other standard defense of this otherwise unjustifiable
provision is as a necessary compromise between the large and
small states: without it, we are told, the Constitution might never
have been successfully written and ratified. While this may or
may not be true, the circumstances of the 1787 Constitutional
Convention reinforced the beliefs of the small states that they
were entitled to equal representation, and made the ultimate
compromise a foregone conclusion. Even before the Convention
began, the state delegations agreed that each state would have a
single vote during the proceedings, regardless of its population.
Moreover, when ev*en that rtile did not preclude a deadlock over
whether to allocate representation by state or by population, the
Convention sent the matter to a Committee of Eleven which consisted of one delegate from each of the states present at the Con6. 137 Cong. Rec. S 14704-05 (October 15, 1991).
7. All calculations are based on the population according to the 1990 census, as
recorded in The World Almanac and Book of Facts: 1995 at 376-77.
8. This is not an isolated example. A minority of the population similarly prevailed
in 1986, when Daniel Manion was confirmed to sit on the Seventh Circuit by a closely
divided vote. A thorough historical search would undoubtedly turn up many other such
incidents.
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vention. More ominous still, the Committee consisted of many
of the most able and vocal delegates from the small states and
none of the most uncompromising firebrands from the large
states. 9 The compromise-or concession, depending on one's
point of view-was inevitable. We can only speculate on the results had the larger states been more insistent from the
beginning.
Why did the large states agree to such a crippling and ridiculous situation? Because, at bottom, they trusted each other and
the likely Senators from each state to represent the interests of
the nation rather than of the individual states. The aristocratic
Senate was never meant to be particularly representative of the
population at large. As the nation became more and more democratic, however, the Senate became an ever more glaring anomaly. The Seventeenth Amendment repaired a small part of the
problem, but the more egregious malapportionment remains.

9. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, A Historyof the American Constitution
128-29 (West Pub. Co., 1990).
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